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"We want the elephant to be a commodity, because if it isn't it might as
well be dead."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Stretching over 3.7 million square miles, through thirty-seven different
countries,2 the African elephant's habitat extends from Ethiopia and Sudan
southward to South Africa and from Senegal eastward to Kenya. Within
this vast expanse of territory, in countries like Botswana and Zimbabwe,
great herds of elephants roam the land.' The Congo Basin forests in eastern
Africa are home to half of the species.5 In other nations, such as Mozam-
bique and Ghana, elephants are a rare sight, as only a few individual
elephants remain.6
When the elephant travels throughout its range, it is welcomed by some
as a magnificent, awe-inspiring creature. Elsewhere, it is uninvited-looked
upon as a destructive, voracious pest capable of devouring an entire season's
crop in a single afternoon.7 Because the elephant is capable of such havoc
and because of the economic and social climate of Africa, the elephant's
existence remains threatened.
International efforts to protect endangered species like the African elephant
culminated in the adoption of the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (hereinafter "CITES"), which
has been the leading international treaty on endangered species trade since
it went into effect in 1975.' Since that time CITES has afforded Loxodonta
africanis (the African elephant) an increased level of protection against
economic exploitation. The elephant was initially placed on Appendix II of
CITES, which still allowed regulated trade and provided only minimal
Buck DeVries of the Gwayi Conservancy in Zimbabwe, Quote of the Day, GREENWIRE,
June 9, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, GRNWE File.
2 SeeAfrican Wildlife Resource Index <http://www.wolfe.net/-scat/index.html>. Countries
in which the elephant is found are called "range states."
3 See id.
4 See id.
' See id.
6 See id.
7 See id.
' See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 12 I.L.M. 1085 (entered into force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter
CITES].
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protection.9 The inadequacies of listing the African Elephant on Appendix
II became evident to the Parties to the Convention as poaching and illegal
trading drove the elephant to near extinction.' In 1989, CITES moved the
elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I in a resolution commonly known
as "the Ivory Ban."" Under the Ivory Ban, all trade in elephant products
was abolished. International ivory prices fell from one-hundred and forty
dollars per pound to five dollars per pound in one year.12 Without a market
for ivory, poaching decreased. Ivory goods became disfavored in the West,
and enforcement efforts by African nations, with the financial assistance of
Western countries, led to a dramatic rebound of elephant populations.'
3
Today, the African elephant population still has not returned to the 1970s
numbers, but some individual countries are experiencing local "surpluses" of
population. Additionally, human populations have substantially increased,
and the struggle for space and resources has led these countries to use
extreme measures-both legal and of a cruder design-to control their
populations.
In a continent largely plagued by civil unrest, poverty, and starvation, the
preservation of the African elephant remains a non-priority to most
Africans.' 4 Countries that appear to have a strong conservationist ethic are
in reality driven by the prospect of attracting Western travelers, who come
for photo-safaris and other eco-tours, and bring much-needed Western
dollars.' 5 However, most Africans see Westerners' preservationist idealism
as contrary to the economic development of the continent.' 6  The same
animal that has become a symbol for the conservation movement is viewed
by many Africans as a dangerous killer and a ravager of crops and
" See id. For a detailed analysis of CITES and its application to elephant conservation
efforts, see infra section II.
'0 See id. at 1100 (Appendix II). CITES Appendices I, II, and III list species which are
afforded differing levels of protection under the treaty. Id. at 1096-1103.
"1 See TED Case Studies, Elephant Ivory Trade Ban, (visited Sept. 27, 1997)
<http://gurukul.ucc.arnerican.edu/ted/elephant.htm>.
12 See id. The Ivory Ban went into effect January 18, 1990, after being accepted by a
majority of the CITES Parties at the October 1989 Conference of the Parties held in
Lausanne, Switzerland. See id.
" See Richard Leakey, A Perspective From Kenya: Elephants Today and Tomorrow,
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, March/April 1993, at 58.
" See John Waithaka, The Elephant Menace, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, March/April
1993, at 62-63.
" See id. at 63.
16 See id. at 62-63.
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property-a vexatious and omnipresent pest.17
Because of economic strife and antagonism towards Western ideals,
several African nations began lobbying for an end to the Ivory Ban at
CITES' 1992 Conference of the Parties. 8 Their efforts proved successful
at the most recent Conference of the Parties,' 9 where it was decided that
trade in ivory would resume under "strict controls" in the nations of
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana by downlisting their elephant populations
from Appendix I to Appendix 11.20 If all conditions are met, Japan will
become the sole trading partner for stockpiled elephant ivory from Zimba-
bwe, Botswana, and Namibia. 21 The sale is to be consummated no earlier
than March 18, 1999, after an 18-month waiting period.22 During this time,
CITES' Standing Committee will evaluate the conservation efforts and
regulatory schemes in each of the potential trading countries, and will decide
if their control mechanisms are sufficiently adequate to allow the trade and
enforce the downlisting of elephant populations.23
The same political pressures that swung the COP-10 vote to support
resuming trade will likely taint the decision-making process of the Standing
Committee, which has representatives of each geographic region, plus a
representative from Zimbabwe, as the host of COP-10, and a representative
from Indonesia, the venue for the 1999 Conference of the Parties (COP-
17 See id.
18 See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA; RESOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (COP-8), held in Kyoto, Japan (March 2-13, 1992) (visited
Nov. 6, 1998) <http:www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/eresol8.htm>.
'9 See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA; INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION, TRADE IN AFRICAN ELEPHANT STOCKPILES OF
IVORY, CITES Doc. 10.46 (June 1997) (visited Nov. 6, 1998)
<http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/edecislO.htm> [hereinafter Doc. 10.46].
20 See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA; CONDITIONS FOR THE
RESUMPTION OF TRADE IN AFRICAN ELEPHANT IVORY FROM POPULATIONS TRANSFERRED TO
APPENDIX II AT THE 10TH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES, CITES Decision
10.1 (visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/englishledecislO.htm>
[hereinafter Decision 10.1].
21 See section III, infra, for a full discussion of the terms of COP-10 ivory decisions.
22 See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA; NOTIFICATION TO THE
PARTIES, CITES Notification No. 984 (July 4, 1997).
23 See id.
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11).24 Funding concerns and a lack of expertise to evaluate the ability of
Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Japan to control the trade are additional
concerns to be addressed before the trade resumes. If the monitoring efforts
are thwarted, the resulting resurgence of elephant poaching and illegal
laundering of ivory through stockpiles could be disastrous for the survival
of the international elephant population.
This note will analyze CITES' downlisting of the African elephant and its
potential to derail conservation efforts. First, because the economic and
social atmosphere in Africa is crucial to the health and survival of both
elephants and mankind, a description of the history of the African elephant's
relationship with humans will be provided, focusing on the inevitable clashes
that have resulted from man's increased land appropriation. Next, the
operation of CITES will be discussed and critiqued, with particular emphasis
on the decisions and resolutions of COP-10. The importance of poaching as
a threat to elephant viability and the increased potential for poaching abuses
brought about by COP-10 will then be outlined. Non-legal conservation
efforts will also be examined, including a summary of the strengths and
weaknesses of each. Finally, this note will argue that economic and political
support is crucial to the strengthening of local governments' capabilities of
complying with CITES and implementing effective conservation efforts.
Before the temporary ivory trade is reinstated, infrastructure ensuring that the
strict provisions of downlisting are enforced must be developed within the
range states. Monitoring ivory stocks and implementing effective anti-
poaching and anti-laundering regimes should be the primary focus before the
sale of ivory stockpiles occurs in March, 1999.
II. HISTORY
In Africa, the elephant is at war with the human. The two species
compete for habitat and for food. Elephants are looked upon as both
voracious pests and sources of wealth. Because of their valuable tusks,
elephants have been poached at an alarming rate. Not until the 1970s did
elephant exploitation reach a massive scale, with the advent of organized
gangs of poachers-who hunt with automatic weapons and launder elephant
24 See Grant Proposal submitted by International Wildlife Coalition for Intercessional
Period between CITES-1997 and CITES-1999, available from IWC [hereinafter IWC Grant
Proposal].
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tusks through several corrupt African governments to foreign destinations. 25
Combined with habitat loss, the devastation of poaching reduced the elephant
population in Africa from an estimated 1,300,000 in 1979 to 609,000 in
1989.26 The elephant species was cut in half during the span of a single
decade.27 The decimation of the African elephant was by no means a
natural occurrence. At the height of the popularity of ivory goods such as
Asian "medicines," aphrodisiacs, and crafts and trinkets on the world market,
as much as one thousand tons of ivory left Africa each year.28 Ninety
percent of that ivory was illegally obtained.29 With the African elephant
death toll reaching up to 200 animals per day 30 and black market ivory
sales increasing exponentially, outcries from conservationists, scientists, and
lawmakers brought about the passage of the Ivory Ban.3 '
The elephant was originally listed on CITES' Appendix II, which includes
"all species which, although not necessarily threatened with extinction now,
may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict
25 See TED Case Studies, supra note 11. The study suggests that the use and availability
of automatic weapons and widespread government corruption in the 1970s were direct causes
of the vast decimation that occurred during that decade.
26 See Andrew J. Heimert, Note, How the Elephant Lost His Tusks, 104 YALE L.J. 1473,
1473 (1995).
2 Since the 1989 ban went into effect, the population has only declined slightly, to
580,000. See Michael D. Lemonick, The Ivory Wars; After a Seven Year Ban, Three African
Nations Want to Sell Tusks. Will the Rest of the World Allow it?, TIME, June 16, 1997, at 64.
' See TED Case Studies, supra note 11, at 25.
29 See Maureen Sajbel, The Agony and the Ivory: The ban hasn't been lifted, but some
think the rumors are enough to restart the slaughtering. Will ivory ever be salable again?
L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1997, at El.
30 See Lemonick, supra note 27, at 64. Some estimates of elephant poaching were even
higher. See Sajbel, supra note 29 (stating that poachers killed an average of 80,000 African
elephants per year during the 1980's).
31 See TED Case Studies, supra note 11. The African elephant was uplisted from its
original designation in Appendix H of CITES (which allows for regulated commercial trade
of listed species), to Appendix I (under which potential exporters and importers must obtain
permits showing that a specific transaction will not endanger the survival of the species
concerned). Species listed in Appendix I are considered to be threatened with extinction, and
trade in their products is "effectively" eliminated. See the discussion of CITES, infra section
III for a more detailed description of CITES' provisions. The CITES Secretariat, headquar-
tered in Geneva, Switzerland, directs the daily operation of CITES implementation and
publishes resolutions and decisions of the Conferences of the Parties. CITES also operates
a website through the World Conservation Monitoring Center,
<http://www.wcmc.org.uk/convent/CITES.html>.
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regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival."32
Though the elephant was afforded some level of protection under Appendix
II, it was still systematically and aggressively poached.33
The 1989 uplisting of the African elephant, however, effectively ended all
trade in elephant parts.' Since 1989, nearly 100 metric tons of ivory has
been seized from poachers.3' The ban forced poachers out of business:
almost immediately some countries saw a 90% decrease in poaching. 36 For
example, in Kenya the yearly poaching average dropped from 3,500
elephants per year in the early 1980s to about 50 in 1993." 7 Prior to the
ban, elephant mortality had been twenty times the sustainable yield 38 of the
continent's population.39
The Ivory Ban had tremendously positive effects on elephant populations.
Since the ban went into effect, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe," and others
32 CITES, supra note 8, at art. II.
33 Black market and legal ivory exports amounted to 770 metric tons (or 75,000 elephants)
before the Ivory Ban. By 1986, seventy-five percent of all raw ivory was derived from illegal
sources. In 1985, CITES Conference Parties established an ivory monitoring unit in response
to this vastly increased trade. The Ivory Trade Review Group (ITRG) developed a quota
system for ivory exporters under which each tusk was coded by country origin and cataloged
for statistical monitoring. Information on elephant herd numbers and trade data were
compiled in a report issued at the 1989 CITES meeting. See TED Case Studies, supra note
11.
" The ban was put into force because efforts such as the ITRG failed to protect elephants
from poachers. Only sixteen of the thirty-five African Parties to CITES complied with ITRG,
while the others took advantage of loopholes by changing their trade routes, pre-working
ivory to meet the classification of "worked ivory" before export, and by simply paying the
grossly insufficient sanctions imposed on them. See TED Case Studies, supra note 11.
35 See Sustainable Arguments, THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 1997, at 83.
36 See Jonathan Fisher, To Ban or Not to Ban? That Will be the Question for Nations
Meeting in June to Decide Whether to Modify a Prohibition on Selling Elephant Parts; Ivory
Trade, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE, May 15, 1997, at 36.
31 See TED Case Studies, supra note 11.
38 The number of animals that can be killed while still maintaining species viability.
39 See Fisher, supra note 36. The ITRG found that Burundi and South Africa had the.
most involvement in the illicit ivory trade. Between 1976 and 1986 tusks from approximately
200,000 elephants were exported from Burundi. As of 1988, although only one live elephant
remained in Burundi, the country's ivory traffickers exported over one-third of the world's
annual total of raw ivory. Thus, most ivory trafficked through Burundi found its way there
from surrounding African range states. See TED Case Studies, supra note 11.
4 Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana were the three main proponents of lifting the Ivory
Ban at COP-10, and are the only countries that will be allowed to sell their stockpiles to
Japan in 1999. See Decision 10.1, supra note 20.
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have seen a dramatic increase in their elephant populations, including larger
herd sizes and older individuals.4' A comparison by the African Elephant
Specialist Group of elephant populations in 1987 and 1989 reveals that
Zimbabwe's population climbed from 43,000 to 67,000 and Botswana's rose
from 51,000 to 81,000.42 In Namibia, elephants have enjoyed a two-thirds
increase. 3 Combined, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana are home to over
150,000 elephants, one-fourth of Africa's estimated total." The success of
elephant populations in these three countries corresponds to their eagerness
to renew international trade.45 As their elephant populations have increased,
so have their efforts to restore trade.
Ivory stockpiles in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana have increased as
well. Tusks taken from government sanctioned culling in wildlife reserves,
natural deaths, and from poachers have dramatically increased each country's
stockpile. Botswana's 1996 stockpile totaled 32.7 tons, up from 5.5 - 5.7
tons in 1990.' Namibia's 1996 stockpile numbered 45.6 tons, up from 22
4, Personal correspondence with Dan Terrell, a Fellow with Congressman George Miller's
(D-Cal.) Resources Committee staff. Mr. Terrell worked extensively on the Fox/Miller
Amendment to H.R. 2159, the House Appropriations Bill in 1997. The amendment would
have disallowed United States funds to be used under "development assistance" in section 572
of H.R. 2159 to "directly support or promote trophy hunting or the international commercial
trade in elephant ivory, elephant hides, or rhinoceros horns" through programs such as
CAMPFIRE. Efforts to amend H.R. 2159 were unsuccessful as of September, 1997. For a
discussion of CAMPFIRE, see infra section VI.C.
42 See id.
43 See Tusks and Horns and Conservationists, THE ECONOMIST, May 31, 1997, at 44.
" See id.
45 Other African range states may soon join Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana.
Tanzania is reportedly seeking buyers for over 70 tons-at least 10 tons more than the
combined authorized sale-of ivory stockpiles. CITES allowance of unspecified "donor
countries and organizations" to buy ivory stockpiles in other African countries (Decision 10.2)
has made potential ivory sales seem attractive to countries like Tanzania. See UNrrED
NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA; CONDITIONS FOR THE DISPOSAL OF
IVORY STOCKS AND GENERATING RESOURCES FOR CONSERVATION IN AFRICAN ELEPHANT
RANGE STATES, CITES Decision 10.2 (visited Nov. 6, 1998)
<http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/decislO.htm> [hereinafter Decision 10.2], and
Tanzania Seeking Buyers for 70 Metric Tons of Ivory, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, November
19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13437346.
4See Lemonick, supra note 27, at 64. These stockpile increases suggest that poaching
occurred at an elevated rate even during the Ivory Ban. Even a temporary lift of the Ban may
cause the current situation to change drastically because it sends a strong message to poachers
[Vol. 27:167
CITES AND THE "IVORY BAN"
tons in 1990.47 Zimbabwe's supply rose from 8.8 - 13.2 tons in 1990 to
32.3 tons in 1996.4 The value of these large stockpiles is the main
impetus behind the bid to reopen ivory trading. The value of the three
nations' ivory stockpiles has recently been estimated at $8 billion. 49 Of
course, that valuation is only theoretical until a sale is allowed. As the
events of COP-10 have illustrated, the potential influx of $8 billion to the
impoverished African economy has proved too enticing for these countries
to ignore. When faced with the choice between conserving an important
natural resource and fostering human health and prosperity, Zimbabwe,
Namibia, and Botswana easily chose the latter.
I. THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED
SPECIES OF FLORA AND FAUNA (CITES)
A. Authority and Purposes of CITES
The CITES Treaty was signed on March 3, 1973 after being drafted by the
World Conservation Union (IUCN) during the late 1960s and early 1970s. °
It was initially ratified by ten nations,51 and it entered into force July 1,
1975.52 In its twenty-four years, the Convention has grown dramatically.
Today, there are 142 parties to the Convention.53 International trade in
over 34,000 species of animals and plants is regulated under the treaty.54
CITES is run by the United Nations Environmental Programme and is
headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.55
The Convention's purpose is to protect "wild fauna and flora in their many
beautiful and varied forms," which it recognizes as being "irreplaceable
part[s] of the natural systems of the earth which must be protected for this
that ivory trade is a legitimate industry. If poaching were to return to the its level during the
early 1980s, the thriving elephant populations in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana and the rest
of Africa would be decimated.
47 See id.
48 See id.
'9 See Lemonick, supra note 27, at 64.
m See CITES, supra note 8, 12 I.L.M. at 1086.
5' See DAVID S. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: A GUIDE TO
CITES xvii (1989).
52 See CITES, supra note 8.
53 See IWC Grant Proposal, supra note 24.
5 See CITES, supra note 8, at 1.
55 See Shennie Patel, Comment, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species: Enforcement and the Last Unicorn, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 157, 163 (1995).
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and the generations to come., 56  The drafters realized that international
cooperation is "essential for the protection of certain species ... against
over-exploitation through international trade., 57  Thus, a regulatory
framework to control such trade was created. The Convention seeks to
reduce the adverse effects of commercial trade on endangered and threatened
species and to ensure that worldwide trade in other species is conducted on
a sustainable basis.58
B. Structure and Operation of CITES
The Convention operates through a system of permits for imports and
exports of species and products derived therefrom. The permits are issued
according to each species' placement on one of three Appendices. The
Appendices list species according to their viability.59 Appendix I includes
"all species threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by
trade," and only allows trade in "exceptional" circumstances.' The African
elephant has been listed in Appendix I since the 1989 Ivory Ban resolu-
tion.6' Export under Appendix I requires a "prior grant and presentation of
an export permit," which may only be granted if four stringent conditions
have been satisfied.62 In order to complete a trade, an import permit, with
additional restrictions, is also required.63
' CITES, supra note 8, at 1.
57 Id.
"8 See Patel, supra note 55, at 163.
59 See CITES, supra note 8, at art. II.
o CITES, supra note 8, at art. II(1).
61 At the inception of CITES in 1976, the African elephant had been placed in Appendix
II, which by 1989 had proven to be an ineffective means of conservation. See generally TED
Case Studies, supra note 11, at 1.
6 These conditions include: the Scientific Authority of the State of export's advisement
that the export will not be detrimental to the survival of the species; the Management
Authority of the State of export's satisfaction that the specimen was not illegally obtained;
assurances that injury, cruelty, and damage to health to a living specimen will be minimized
during shipment and preparation; and proof of an import permit. See CITES, supra note 8,
at art. 11(2).
63 The requirements of import permits include: prior grant of import permit and an export
permit or re-export certificate and a Scientific Authority of the State of import's advisement
that the import will be for purposes not detrimental to the survival of the species involved.
Additionally, for living specimens: satisfaction of the Scientific Authority that the specimen
will be suitably housed and cared for and satisfaction that the specimen will not be used
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Appendix II lists species that "although not necessarily now threatened
with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is
subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with
their survival." Trade of Appendix II species requires only export permits
to be issued,' and is thus less stringently regulated than trade of Appendix
I species.
Appendix III covers other internationally traded species that are subject to
regulation within the jurisdiction of a member nation, yet require the
cooperation of other Parties to the Convention to control international
trade.' Trade under Appendix III requires a permit from the exporting
country specifying that the traded specimen was not illegally obtained and
that living specimens are shipped in a matter that will minimize the risk of
injury or cruelty to the species.67
C. Criteria for Listing a Species
Central to the debate about ivory sales is the Appendix listing of the
African elephant. The language of the treaty offers no specific guidelines for
the listing of species;6" therefore, there has been an ongoing debate over the
listing criteria since the first Conference of the Parties. 69 At that Confer-
ence, the Parties adopted, as the first resolution, the "Berne Criteria" for the
listing of species. 70  Though vague, the Criteria provided a rough set of
primarily for commercial purpose. See CITES, supra note 8, at art. 111(3).
6 CITES, supra note 8, at art. I(2)(a).
65See id. at art. IV(2).
"See id. at art. 11(3).
67 See id. at art. V(2).
68 See id. at art. II.
6See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA, CITES CONFERENCES, HELD
IN BERNE, SWITZERLAND (1976) (visited Oct. 3, 1998)
<http://www.wcmc.org.uk/convent/CITES.html>.
70 The Berne Criteria derived its name from the Conference's host city. The text of the
first resolution of Conference 1. 1reads: Criteria for the Addition of Species and Other Taxa
to Appendices I and H and for the Transfer of Species and Other Taxa from Appendix a to
Appendix 1 (1976):
DECIDED that in determining the appropriate appendix into which a
species or other taxon should be placed the biological and trade status of
the taxon should be evaluated together.
1998]
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factors for the listing of species. Still, Party States, whose representatives
are usually not scientists and are largely unqualified to independently
evaluate data on the status of species population sizes,7" may consider many
other factors in their debates over the amount of protection to be given.
Under the Berne Criteria, economic and political self-interest, ethical
positions and popular sentimentality are but a few of the many extraneous
factors that may be utilized by Party States in developing their positions on
listing species.72
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and South Africa began a
movement to change the listing criteria in 1992 at the Kyoto Conference
(COP-8)." This "Consumptive Use Block" (so named because of their
Appendix I
1. Biological status. To qualify for Appendix I, a species must be
currently threaten [sic] with extinction. Information of any of the
following types should be required, in order of preference: (a) scientific
reports on the population size or geographic range of the species over a
number of years, (b) scientific reports on the population size or geograph-
ic range of the species based on single surveys, (c) reports by reliable
observers other than scientists on the population size or geographic range
of the species over a number of years, or (d) reports from various sources
on habitat destruction, heavy trade or other potential causes of extinction
2. Trade status. Species meeting the biological criteria should be
listed in Appendix I if they are or may be affected by international trade.
This should include any species that might be expected to be traded for
any purpose, scientific or otherwise. Particular attention should be given
to any species for which such trade might, over a period of time, involve
numbers of specimens constituting a significant portion of the total
population size necessary for the continued survival of the species. The
biological status and trade status of a species are obviously related. When
biological data show a species to be declining seriously, there need be
only a probability of trade. When trade is known to occur, information
on the biological status need not be as complete. This principle
especially applies to groups of related species, where trade can readily
shift from one species that is well-known to another for which there is
little biological information.
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA, CITES conf. 1.1 (1976), reprinted
in FAVRE, supra note 51, at 395 (app. E).
71 See David S. Favre, Debate Within the CITES Community: What Directions for the
Future, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 875, 898 (1993).
72 See id. at 898.
73 For a detailed analysis of the rejected "Kyoto Criteria," see id. at 899-902.
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belief in exploitation of natural resources as a necessary means of acquiring
economic wealth) strongly disapproved of the listing of the African elephant
on Appendix I in 1989 under the Berne Criteria.74 Therefore, the Block
proposed the "Kyoto Criteria," which were ultimately rejected at COP-8.
The Kyoto Criteria would have required the party requesting the listing of
a species on Appendix I to show a twenty percent probability of extinction
within ten years or ten generations, and would have allowed trade of
Appendix I species under a quota system when such trade is beneficial."
Further, it would have set up symmetrical listing criteria for removal and
placement of species on the Appendices, and would have instituted a
presumption for Appendix II listing instead of Appendix I. The Kyoto
Criteria would also have eliminated "split listings" by taking a global view
of population levels.76
In 1994, developing countries again lobbied to change the Beme Criteria.
At the Ninth Meeting of the Parties in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, November
7-18, 1994, the Convention adopted a new set of criteria.77 Drafted by
biologists from the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the "Fort Lauderdale
Criteria" established a new set of population tests to be used to measure
species in placement on the Appendices. After the Fort Lauderdale Criteria
was adopted, the process of listing species became clearer and firmer.
Annex 1 to the Resolution of the Conference of the Parties details the new
biological criteria for Appendix 1.78 A species will now be listed in
Appendix I if its population is small (5,000 or less) and one or more of the
following criteria are met: (1) if there is a 50% decline in the number of
individuals in a species within ten years or three generations, or a similar
reduction in the area and quality of the habitat; (2) if only a very small sub-
population is found; (3) if a majority of individuals is concentrated in one
sub-population during a life phase; (4) if there are large short-term
fluctuations in the number of individuals; or (5) if there is high vulnerability
due to species biology or behavior.79
74 See id. at 898-899.
71 See id. at 900.
76 See id.
7 For a discussion of the Fort Lauderdale Criteria, see Lauren DeBunda, Recent
Development in International Environmental Law: Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES) Ninth Meeting, November 7-18, 1995 [sic], 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REv. 486 (1996).
78 See id.
79 See id. at 486.
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Alternatively, if a species has limited geographic range, it may be listed
on Appendix I if the species meets a similar set of criteria: wild populations
with an area of distribution less than 2.5 million acres; fragmentation of the
species (occurrence at only a few locations); large fluctuations in area of
distribution or number of sub-populations; or biological- or behavioral-
vulnerability. An observed, inferred or projected decrease in area of
distribution, number of sub-populations, number of individuals, area or
quality of habitat, or reproductive potential would place the species in
Appendix 1.80
A third impetus for listing a species under the Fort Lauderdale Criteria is
a decline in the number of individuals of the species in the wild. This
analysis is concerned with ongoing declinations or historical declinations that
may potentially resume. Decreases in habitat area and quality and patterns
of exploitation are relevant to determining the possibility of new decline in
the number of individuals. 81 The Fort Lauderdale Criteria has been viewed
by some observers as an attempt to inject objectivity into what previously
operated only as policymaking by utilizing principles of population
biology. 2 However, scientific data about species range and population size
is difficult and expensive to acquire, and always retains certain levels of
imprecision. 3 The Fort Lauderdale Criteria's reliance on pure science
gives a sense of false certainty to an issue that depends upon many
unscientific factors, such as international and national policy, human
population and land use trends, and public morality.8
IV. COP-10 IVORY DECISIONS
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana successfully lobbied for the downlist-
ing of the African elephant to Appendix II at COP-10. The resulting
Decision of the Parties, entitled Conditions for the resumption of trade in
African elephant ivory from populations transferred to Appendix H at the
80 See id. at 487.
8' See id. at 487.
82 See Kevin Eldridge, Note, Whale for Sale?: New Developments in the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 24 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 549, 551 (1995).
83 See id. at 562.
84 Additionally, there is a lack of consensus among biologists and ecologists as to the
accuracy and sufficiency of specific numbers given in the Fort Lauderdale criteria. The risk
of extinction of a species meeting the criteria is artificially precise. See generally id.
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10th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (listed as CITES Decision
10.1)5 (hereinafter "Decision 10.1") provides details of conditions for
downlisting. Part A of Decision 10.1 outlines the conditions for resumption
of trade in raw ivory as requested by the range states.8 6 The relevant
prerequisites to resuming trade are eight-fold. First, deficiencies identified
by the CITES Panel of Experts 7 must be remedied.'8 Second, the CITES
Secretariat, in consultation with the African regional representatives, must
verify that the conditions in the Decision have been fulfilled.8 9 Next, the
Standing Committee must agree that all of the conditions in this Decision
have been met.90 The withdrawal of the range states' reservations to the
transfer of the African elephant to Appendix I is the fourth prerequisite. 9'
The trading countries must also support and commit to international
cooperation in law enforcement through such mechanisms as the Lusaka
Agreement. 92 Range states must also strengthen and/or establish mecha-
nisms to reinvest trade revenues into elephant conservation.93 A seventh
requirement is an agreement by the Standing Committee to provide a
mechanism to halt trade and immediately re-transfer to Appendix I
populations that have been transferred to Appendix II in the event of non-
compliance with the conditions in the Decision or of the escalation of illegal
hunting of elephants or trade in elephant products owing to the resumption
of legal trade.94  Additionally, range states must comply with all other
precautionary undertakings in the supporting statements to the proposals
adopted at the 10th meeting of the Conference of the Parties.95 The
relevant range states, the CITES Secretariat, TRAFFIC International and any
other approved party must additionally agree to an international reporting and
monitoring system for legal and illegal international trade, through an
85 See Decision 10.1, supra note 20.
86 The range states are Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana.
" The CITES Panel of Experts operate under authority of Resolution Conf. 7.9, which
was replaced by Resolution Conf. 10.9 at the Harare Convention. The Resolution Conference
texts are available at <http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/eresols.htm>.
"8 See Decision 10.1, supra note 20, at A(a).
'9 See id. at A(b).
o See id. at A(c).
9' See id. at A(d).
92 See id. at A(e). See generally infra note 113 (discussing the Lusaka Agreement).
9' See id. at A(f).
9 See id. at A(g).
95 See id. at A(h).
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international database in the CITES Secretariat and TRAFFIC International
and a monitoring system for illegal trade and illegal hunting within or
between elephant range states.96
If all of the conditions in Decision 10.1 are met, the Standing Committee
will then make available its evaluation of legal and illegal trade and legal
offtake pursuant to the implementation of Resolution Conf. 10.10 as soon as
possible after the experimental trade has taken place.97 This will entail the
Standing Committee's identification, in cooperation with the range states, of
any negative impacts of this conditional resumption of trade and the
Committee's determination and proposition of corrective measures.98
Decision 10.2 deals with disposal of ivory stocks and generating resources
for conservation in African elephant range States.99 It begins with the
contextual statement that the African elephant range States recognize the
threats that stockpiles pose to sustainable legal trade and that stockpiles are
a vital economic resource for them."°° It next recognizes the funding
commitments made by donor countries and agencies to offset the loss of
assets to those range States from placing the elephant on Appendix I, but
points out that those funding efforts have failed to secure economic well-
being to those countries in the form of conservation and community-based
conservation and development programs.' 0' The Decision recognizes that
at the Ninth Meeting, the Conference of the Parties directed the Standing
Committee to review the issue of stockpiles and to report back at the Tenth
Meeting.0 2 The Decision mandates that the African elephant range states
deposit all revenues from any purchase of stockpiles by donor countries and
organizations into conservation trust funds, to be managed by Boards of
Trustees (such as representatives of governments, donors, the CITES
Secretariat, etc.). 03 These funds would direct the proceeds into enhanced
conservation, monitoring, capacity building and local community-based
programs, and they must have a positive rather than harmful influence on
elephant conservation."
96 See id. at A(i)(i)-(i)(ii).
97 See id. at B(a).
98 See id. at B(b).
99 See Decision 10.2, supra note 45.
'oo See Decision 10.1, supra note 20, at (a)(i)-(ii).
101 See Decision 10.2, supra note 45, at (a)(iii).
o'2 See id. at (a)(iv).
103 See id. at (b)-(b)(i).
'o' See id. at (b)(i)-(b)(ii).
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The Decision next details the mechanics of the trade, described as "a one-
off purchase for non-commercial purposes of government stocks."' 0 5 All
stockpiles to be traded will need to be declared by the range states to the
CITES Secretariat within a 90-day period before the transfer to Appendix II
of the Zimbabwean, Botswanan, and Namibian elephant populations takes
effect in 1999."°  Additionally, "the ivory stocks declared should be
marked in accordance with the ivory marking system approved by the
Conference of the Parties in Resolution Conf. 10.10," including the source
of ivory stocks."07 Ivory stocks are also to be stored in specific locations
in order to limit laundering of poached ivory through legitimate stock-
piles.1ta TRAFFIC International will conduct independent audits of
declared stocks to ensure their validity and to prevent laundering of poached
ivory.0 9
In order to prevent illegal trade, Decision 10.2 calls upon donor States to
monetarily assist African elephant Range states that have not yet been able
to register and develop adequate controls over their ivory stocks."0 The
expressed purpose of registration and control over ivory stocks is "to
establish a level of conservation management conducive to the long-term
survival of the African elephant.""' Range states wishing to participate
in the sale of stockpiled ivory must report to the CITES Secretariat and
TRAFFIC International through an international database of legal ivory
trading.12 An international monitoring system to track illegal trade and
hunting is to be set up through CITES as well, with support from TRAFFIC
International, the IUCN/SSC African Elephant Specialist Group and the
Lusaka Agreement." 3
o See id. at (c).
'06 See id.
107 See Decision 10.2, supra note 45, at (c).
108 See id.
'o See id. TRAFFIC International is the organization which oversees CITES enforcement
in Africa. It maintains a website found at <http://www.traffic.org>.
10 See Decision 10.2, supra note 45.
." See id. at (d).
12 See id. at (f)(i).
113 See id. at (f)(ii). The Lusaka Agreement was signed by six African countries on
September 9, 1994, and established an international wildlife task force, which is designed to
reduce international trafficking in African wildlife by combating cross-border poaching and
instituting a multi-national "police force." Initially funded by the United States, Canada,
Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom, the Lusaka Agreement needs additional funds
to maintain its viability. It is open for signature by all African countries, but does not yet
1998]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The decision to downlist the African elephant and resume ivory trade was
argued vigorously at COP-10. The United States, several West, Central, and
East African countries, and South American and Asian countries were in
opposition.'14 Japan, Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe were joined by
other countries such as Pacific island nations,' 15 ex-Soviet Union
states," 6 and countries which philosophically endorse wildlife trade under
any circumstances." 7 Fifteen members of the European Union abstained
from the vote, thus enabling the pro-trade group to obtain the necessary two-
thirds majority."'
V. POACHING AFrER COP-10
News of the temporary lift of the ban has already spawned new poaching
activity. In Zimbabwe, poaching immediately increased by fifty percent." 9
Willis Makombe, acting head of the Department of National Parks and
Wildlife in Harare, Zimbabwe, reported that the average number of poached
elephants for the six months prior to the ban lift was four per month and that
there were six reported poachings during the month following COP-1O.' 20
The difficulty and expense of "fingerprinting" tusks by isotope analysis,
combined with the limited resources of African countries to set up adequate
controls to prevent laundering of poached ivory through the legal stockpiles
of the three nations, has made poaching very attractive to some.' 2' Chris
enjoy universal support. See Zambia: African States Set Up International Wildlife Task
Force, BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Sept. 12, 1994 available in WESTLAW, Int-News
Database.
114 See IWC Grant Proposal, supra note 24.
115 Pacific island nations such as Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are economically driven
by Japan. See id.
16 See id. The ex-Soviet Union states have similar economic problems to African states,
and thus are willing to support trophy hunting of critically endangered species.
"7 See id. Norway, Argentina, Indonesia, and Canada have historically supported
liberalized international trade in wildlife.
"Is See id. The European Union has historically been against ivory trade, and if the Party
States had voted, the elephant downlisting would most likely have not garnered a two-thirds
majority.
"9 See Elephant Poaching Up Since Ivory Trade Ban Lift: report, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Sept. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13394598.
120 See id.
121 See Eddie Koch, Ivory Plan Splits Elephant Experts, NEW SCIENTIST, June 28, 1997,
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Styles, an elephant specialist with the International Fund for Animal Welfare
in Johannesburg sees the potential for widespread abuse, predicting a
"massive wave of poaching" in areas such as the Democratic Republic of
Congo, formerly Zaire. 122 The Democratic Republic of Congo is home to
one of the largest populations of elephants, estimated at 65,000.123 But
even Congo's population is less than half of its 1987 total of 145,000 ele-
phants. 
24
In Namibia's West Caprivi Game Park, Divundu area villagers killed at
least two elephants in July, 1997.125 Lacking transportation for patrols and
armed only with inoperable communication equipment,'26 the Park's
conservation officials were under-staffed and ill-equipped 27 to deal with
numerous poachers, equipped with high-powered weapons like the AK-47
assault rifle. 12
8
The story is the same across Africa. The western African nation of Ghana
reported its first poaching since the imposition of the ivory ban. In
September, only shortly after COP-10, 29 five elephants were killed and
their tusks hacked off at Muge Ranch, a private reserve near Nanyuki,
Kenya.130 Since the 1989 ban poaching in Kenya had dropped dramatical-
ly: in fact, these were the first elephants killed in Kenya in over nine
months. 13' At its height in the middle 1970s, Kenyan poaching reached an
average of 19,000 elephants per year. 112 After the ban, however, the yearly
average death rate for elephants in that country remained stable at thirty-
four. 133 Today, Kenyan conservationists' pride in low poaching numbers
has turned to anxiety since the post-COP-10 resurgence of poaching."3
Kenya's herd is currently estimated at 26,000.13
122 See id.
123 Personal correspondence with Dan Terrell, supra note 42.
4 See id.
" See Chrispin Inambao, Poachers on the Loose in West Caprivi, THE NAMIBIAN, July
23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12808277.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See IWC Grant Proposal, supra note 24.
'30 See Ivory Poachers Kill 5 Elephants in Kenya, ATLANTA JOURNAIJCONSTITUTION, Oct.
5, 1997, at D2.
3 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id.
'34 See id.
135 See id.
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Even with the ban in place, Zimbabwe has illegally exported vast
quantities of ivory, which has reached Japan, South Africa, China, Thailand,
Hong Kong, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the U.S. 36 The ivory, held in
Zimbabwe by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management
(DNPWLM), can legally be sold within Zimbabwean borders because
Zimbabwe exempted itself from the 1989 ban.'37 However, the receiving
countries are all CITES members that have agreed not to import ivory and
have enacted laws to that effect.138 Between 1992 and 1995 sales of raw,
semi-worked, and worked ivory averaged 3.6 metric tons per year. 39 In
the first nine months of 1996, 10 metric tons of the 28,194 stockpiled metric
tons were sold."4° The system of internal ivory trade in Zimbabwe (not
regulated under CITES) was already in dire need of fixing, as corruption and
graft led to the issuance of "personal use" permits for commercial exports
and pocketing of funds. 41  Sales to Japan alone were worth U.S.
$90,000.142 The flourishing illegal ivory trade is evidence that a lifting of
the ban will almost certainly worsen conservation efforts.
VI. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
Several issues remain after COP-10 that will shape the effectiveness of
elephant conservation. Increased poaching since the Ivory Ban was lifted
may warrant a re-listing of all elephant populations to Appendix I.
43
Short of reinstating the Ivory Ban, steps need to be taken to insure that the
conditions of Decision 10.1 are met. The International Wildlife Coalition
has agreed to present data to the Animals Committee,'" which studies
" See Polly Ghazi, Too Dangerous to Trade?, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 8, 1997, at 12.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See id.
'4o See id.
141 See id.
142 See Ghazi, supra note 136, at 12.
143 Ghana, Liberia, and India have already agreed to act as proponents at COP 11 for the
re-listing of all elephants on Appendix I. See IWC Grant Proposal, supra note 24, at 5.
'" See IWC Grant Proposal, supra note 24, at 5. The CITES Animals Committee
administers the Significant Trade Review Process. The Animals Committee can control or
stop trade that endangers Appendix II species until problems encountered in range states are
rectified. In early 1998 and 1999 the Animals Committee will meet in Ivory Coast and
Australia respectively. See also CITES, supra note 8.
[Vol. 27:167
CITES AND THE "IVORY BAN"
trade in Appendix II species'45 and can recommend closure of trade to the
Standing Committee 146 if such trade is detrimental to the survival of the
species.1 47 The Standing Committee will then decide whether ivory trade
may resume by evaluating each of the criteria developed in Decisions 10.1
and 10.2. Problems addressed by the Panel of Experts report to COP-
10,148 including illegal trade of ivory from southern Africa, must be fixed.
Additionally, ivory stockpiles must be monitored to ensure that no illegally
obtained or freshly poached ivory is laundered through existing stockpiles.
The Standing Committee must also define and set up an international
reporting system to be followed by both importers and exporters and develop
a legal mechanism to revert elephant populations to Appendix I if poaching
abuses follow resumption of trade. 49
A. Some Other Solutions
The elephant's plight cannot simply be solved by international agreement.
Policies advocated at this abstract level must be implemented and enforced
nationally and locally. Because "donor" governments from the west have not
adequately funded elephant conservation efforts, poor range states have been
left with little resources to comply with CITES' mandate. Lack of support
for elephant conservation, combined with civil crises and starvation, have led
range states either to abandon conservation efforts or to seek innovative ways
of carrying them out. The recent Decisions are one such innovative
"solution." Other solutions have been implemented without the rubric of
international conventions.
Recovery and prosperity of local populations in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and
Botswana have led to those countries' push for new trade. While a
resumption of trade is a dangerous experiment, the current situation presents,
if nothing else, an opportunity for preservationists to explore various
mechanisms that would hopefully lead to a long-term solution. The need for
novel solutions is evident by the COP-10 Decisions. The recovery of
15 The African elephant is only listed on Appendix II for Namibia, Zimbabwe, and
Botswana. See Decision 10.1, supra note 20.
'4 The Standing Committee, CITES' primary decision-making body, will review measures
taken by Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe and will decide whether the three countries may
resume trade in ivory after the 18 month waiting period. See IWC Grant Proposal, supra note
24, at 4.
,47 See CITES, supra note 8 at art. IV(2)(a).
148 See generally IWC Grant Proposal, supra note 24.
'49 See IWC Grant Proposal, supra note 24, at 6.
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elephant populations that has taken place in these three countries is a model
for the rest of Africa. However, if every other range state reacts to its
elephants' recovery in a similar fashion, resuming global ivory trade will
most likely lead to renewed decline in elephant vitality. Thus, African
elephant populations stand to be subject to continued pressures of trade and
poaching if the needs of their human "caretakers" cannot be met as well. If
the partial lift of the Ivory Ban is not successful (as evidence of renewed
poaching would suggest), other, more effective solutions need to be ready to
be put in place.150  Examples of such schemes include culling, fencing,
sustainable use, and sustainable development.'15
Culling, long used in Zimbabwe, may have worked too successfully in that
country. In national parks and reserves, officials routinely limit elephant
population size by controlled killing of the herds. 2 It is arguably because
these efforts have kept the elephant population viable that Zimbabwe has
succumbed to the economic pressure to sell its stockpiled ivory.'53 Culling
is only used in a few countries, and is strongly opposed on ethical grounds
in others. Richard Leaky, former head of the Kenya Wildlife Service
summed up his country's opposition to culling by saying, "there is plenty of
evidence that elephants are intelligent, social animals. Can we morally
justify culling such creatures? I think not."'' 54 Mr. Leaky's sentiments are
echoed by researchers who study elephants throughout Africa because of
elephants' sophisticated and human-like range of responses. 55  Neverthe-
less, ecologists and conservationists begrudgingly admit that culling has
proved an effective (if unpalatable) means of preserving elephant habitat and
affording some economic benefit-in the form of meat-to humans. 156
"5 See Patty F. Storey, Note, Development vs. Conservation: The Future of the African
Elephant, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 375 (1994) for a good discussion of possible
alternative conservation schemes.
'5' See id. at 388-396.
152 See Edward R. Ricciutii, The Elephant Wars, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION
March/April 1993, at 26.
"s See Storey, supra note 150, at 382.
' Richard E. Leaky, A Perspective From Kenya: Elephants Today and Tomorrow,
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, March/April 1993, at 89.
155 Elephant researcher Cynthia Moss describes her work in the Amboseli Park in Kenya,
where she has documented complex familial relationships, reactions to death, recognition, and
other sympathetic traits in Karen Peterson, Interview with Cynthia Moss, Elephants I Know,
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, March/April 1993, at 38.
'- In Zimbabwe, elephant meat from culls is distributed to locals. Hides and tusks that
were sold before the Ivory Ban now form part of the country's stockpile. See Storey, supra
note 150, at 382.
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Culling has been a. popular short-term solution to elephant-human
problems because of the direct benefits to locals and the maintenance of
stable populations. 57  However, culling poses long-term danger to ele-
phants in two ways. First, culling may reduce heterogeneity of the genetic
population. While culling does not target the strong, large males like
poaching, it can pose similar dangers if not carefully executed. 58  Addi-
tionally, culling adds to the ivory stockpile, creating pressure for increased
trade. Culling is also carried out only within national parks, leaving a large
area with no solution at all.
159
Aldo Leopold's premise that effective land management provides the most
effective wildlife management"6 has largely been unheeded throughout
Africa. Though Western conservationists working in Africa have advocated
proactive land management, only a few elephants live within the protective
areas of national parks.' 6' Expansion of parks is a constant priority, but
lack of funding and the increasing resource needs of elephant populations
make park expansion an unrealistic comprehensive solution.'62 Therefore,
African governments must look to other alternatives, such as fencing,
translocation, birth control and sustainable use, to preserve elephants while
supporting economic prosperity.' 63
157 See Storey, supra note 150, at 383.
158 For example, Zimbabwe's practice of eradicating entire female headed "families"
creates generation gaps and eliminates entire sections of the gene pool. While this method
is preferable to killing males, who are better able to spread their genes by impregnating
multiple females, the gene pool is still unnaturally diminished. See Peterson, supra note 155.
159 See id.
6o See Aldo Leopold, GAME MANAGEMENT (1933).
161 Poaching in parks has also remained steady throughout the Ivory Ban, and new
evidence of increased poaching has arisen since the COP-10 decision. See Hugh Dellios,
Ivory Sales May Put Elephants at Risk Conservationists Say Kenya's Herds Face Increased
Poaching, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, January 1, 1998, at 8. Eighty percent of the elephants' range
is on unprotected land, however. See Conservation Issues, "The Challenge of African
Elephant Conservation, " (visited Oct. 3, 1998)
<http://www.worldwildlife.org/new/issues/apr_97/>.
162 Almost 740,000 miles of elephant range in Africa lie within government-protected
areas. Because elephants are migratory animals, huge swaths of land must be protected for
effective conservation. Opportunities are becoming more limited for new preserve purchases
as human population increases mandate land use that emphasizes farming. See Conservation
Issues, supra note 161.
163 See id.
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Outside the park atmosphere, fencing has been used to keep elephants
from destroying crops and to avoid conflicts between elephants and humans.
Because elephants need tremendous amounts of space and food,"M they
threaten to damage or destroy crops, pastures, property, and people. Fencing
farmed areas has proven to be successful in many regions of Africa, most
notably Kenya.165 Kenya's experience with fence use has revealed that
primitive fence structures are as effective as costly high-voltage fencing1
66
Fencing allows farmers to protect their crops and at the same time allows
elephants free range in migration. 167 Thus, fencing may prove to be a low-
cost solution for deterring conflicts between humans and elephants.
Because some regions of Africa are overpopulated and some are home to
very few animals, intra-continental translocation has been explored as another
nonlegal conservation tool. 68  South Africa and Zimbabwe have shipped
family groups as a means of combating overpopulation. 69 In 1993, 700
elephants were moved from Zimbabwe's Gonarezhou National Park to the
Save Valley Conservancy and Madikwe National Park in South Africa.'
70
While translocation has been an effective and humane temporary solution to
overpopulation, critics of its practice argue that its expense and complicated
logistics make it an unwise practice.' 7' The practice may also simply shift
the burden of population management problems from one location to
another. 72  Thus, it is imperative that suitable locations with adequate
protection measures and exploitable resources are targeted as receiving areas.
Additionally, translocated elephants have been known to exhibit more
aggression toward humans because of their unfamiliarity with new surround-
ings. 73 Translocation's benefits may be outweighed by its creation of new
problems.
'64 Elephants spend about 16 hours a day eating. An adult bull consumes over 500
pounds of vegetation per day. See id.
'65 See Storey, supra note 150, at 383.
'6 See id.
167 See id. (discussing the benefits of separating humans and elephants through fencing).
168 See Conservation Issues, supra note 161 (discussing South Africa and Zimbabwe's
translocation of family groups including adult bulls).
169 See id.
170 See id.
17, See id. (discussing the drawbacks of translocation).
172 See id
173 See id.
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Attempts have also been made to keep the elephant population at a
sustainable level by use of contraception and crop pepper sprays-used in a
similar fashion as pesticides-that deter elephant consumption. 74 Both of
these methods are new and untested, but their use may be expanded in the
near future as adverse effects are discovered and weighed against possible
benefits. 
75
B. The Need for a Strong Legal Framework
The above described practices of controlling elephant populations, used in
conjunction, have been moderately successful in preserving a rich genetic
pool and healthy herd sizes. However, their piecemeal application and
limited scope are drawbacks that cannot be overcome by reliance on non-
legal solutions alone. Thus, sustainable use programs such as CAMPFIRE
have been developed and advocated as comprehensive frameworks within
which conservation methods are carried out.' 76 While the idea of sustain-
able use has been criticized by some as exploitative, it has the potential to
be effective if it is implemented within a strong legal framework. Noncon-
sumptive use must be foremost among sustainable uses, and strict anti-
poaching and anti-trade laws must be implemented and enforced. Africa's
volatile political atmosphere and economic crises have to date proved
insurmountable obstacles to this goal; 77 therefore, strong commitment by
western developed nations to fund and provide expertise in legislative
drafting are needed. 7 1 Operating under international and regional frame-
works, national governments could then more effectively carry out sustain-
able use programs that protect elephants and stimulate local economies.
Sustainable use is the use of renewable resources, including endangered
species, "at a rate within its capacity for renewal.' 79  The idea first
originated in the IUCN's World Conservation Strategy,' which outlines
174 See Conservation Issues, supra note 161.
17 See id.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 See id.
17 Catherine L. Krieps, Sustainable Use of Endangered Species under CITES: is it a
Sustainable Alternative?, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 461, 463 (1996).
"o International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources et al., World
Conservation Strategy 1980, reprinted in 23 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT: TREATIES AND RELATED DOcUMENTS 420, 451-53 (Bernd Ruster et al. eds.,
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"three main objectives to living resource conservation" as: "(1) ensuring the
sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems; (2) promoting genetic
diversity; and (3) maintaining the essential ecological processes and the life-
support systems on which human survival and development depend."
18
'
Sustainable use has been advocated by at least two distinct and divergent
groups. One group, represented in CITES by South African nations, China
and Japan, 82 is willing to utilize consumptive use practices such as ivory
trade and hunting. Another group, unorganized yet equally vocal, advocates
ecotourism and other nonconsumptive uses as primary uses. Both viewpoints
stem from the idea that economic prosperity generates the resources
necessary for environmental protection.1 83  Poor elephant range states
simply do not have the capital to implement effective conservation strategies,
and therefore must rely on outside sources for funding. The current
"experiment" in resuming ivory trade is one way of obtaining such funding:
all revenues from the ivory sales are to be applied to conservation ef-
forts.' But those concerned about reopening channels for poaching and
resuming illegal trade have other ways of funding conservation efforts. Two
such methods are community-based programs such as CAMPFIRE and a
debt-for-ivory program. 85  Additionally, donor nations can give outright
grants to conservation efforts.' 86 Long term solutions to the elephant
problem can best be achieved by bringing economic prosperity to range
states.
1981) [hereinafter World Conservation Strategy].
'8' Krieps, supra note 179, at 474.
182 These countries formed a "Sustainable Use Alliance" just prior to the Kyoto COP, and
have focused their efforts on converting supporters for sustainable use under CITES. The
Sustainable Use Alliance began lobbying for downlisting of African elephants at the Kyoto
Conference and were instrumental in the development of the Fort Lauderdale Criteria. Their
efforts played a key role in the passage of the downlisting agreement at COP-10. See Krieps,
supra note 179, at 475.
183 As described by the National Commission on the Environment in its report Choosing
a Sustainable Future (1993), at xv.
'1 See Doc. 10.46, supra note 19.
181 See Doug Williamson, Debt, the African Elephant, and Ivory Stocks, available from
the International Wildlife Policy Program, World Wildlife Foundation.
'86 The United States has given a 10-year, $28 million grant for administration, training
and infrastructure to CAMPFIRE through the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). See id.
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C. CAMPFIRE
The villagers within elephant ranges suffer the brunt of elephant breakouts.
Their hostility to preservation efforts is unmatched, and with good reason.
For the villagers, the elephant does nothing but destroy their crops, houses,
and ruin their livelihood. In order to integrate the lives of poor Zimbabwe-
ans and elephants, i.e. to turn the elephant into income, Zimbabwe formed
the Communal Areas Management Programme (CAMPFIRE).8 7 Formed
in 1990, just after the Ivory Ban went into effect, CAMPFIRE provides a
vehicle through which communities manage their local wildlife. 188 Under
CAMPFIRE, local governments are given control over-and profit
from-natural resources as an incentive to maintain them.'89 Profits come
from several different sources, including hunting exhibitions, eco-tourism and
photo-safaris." Villagers also keep the meats, hides and ivory from
elephant culls.' 9'
CAMPFIRE has been criticized because of its reliance on hunting and its
apparent inability to become self-sufficient.'92 The program has been
funded since its inception by donor nations.1 93  While self-sufficiency
remains a goal, continued reliance on outside funding will continue for the
foreseeable future. Through USAID, the United States has pledged over $28
million dollars to CAMPFIRE for operating years 1996 - 1999. '
94
187 See "Can 'CAMPFIRE' Save the Elephants?" (visited Oct. 5, 1998)
<http://www.ru.ac.za/saep/departmentslaw/SAenviro/subject/natcom/natparkscanpfir2.html>.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See id.
19 See "Can 'CAMPFIRE' Save the Elephants?", supra note 187. Two United States
Congressmen strongly opposed the United States' contribution to CAMPFIRE during the
1997-98 session. Congressmen Jon Fox and George Miller proposed an amendment to H.R.
2159, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, which would have banned the use of United
States taxes to "promote or support trophy hunting or the international commercial trade in
ivory, [or] elephant hides.. ." Though the amendment was not passed, it did bring attention
to members of Congress that CAMPFIRE is heavily dependent on foreign funds and that big-
game hunting is subsidized by those funds. The Fox/Miller amendment, while providing for
continued funding of CAMPFIRE, would have earmarked those funds for nonconsumptive
uses of elephants. Personal correspondence with Dan Terrell, supra note 42.
194 See "This is Satya: Eco-Action Alert" (visited Oct. 5, 1998)
<http://www.montelis.com/satya/backissues/apr97/ecoaction.html>.
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The need for programs like CAMPFIRE stems from a long history of
alienation of indigenous people by colonial powers. When Zimbabwe was
known as Rhodesia under British rule, the best agricultural land was reserved
for Europeans. Thus, Africans had to compete with elephants for farm-
land.' 95 By the 1950s, when game reserves were formed, the already
displaced communities were again forced to relocate. Antagonism toward
wildlife can thus be traced back to imperial oppression,
9 6
CAMPFIRE's immediate roots trace back to Rhodesia's 1975 Parks and
Wildlife Act, which first permitted area landowners to use wildlife.
9 7
Previously, animals were considered "royal game," and could not be used by
the public. 9 8 The Act's 1982 amendments enabled local government to
receive profits through wildlife use.199 CAMPFIRE has grown as an
extension of this "use" policy.2" Currently, twenty-seven of Zimbabwe's
fifty-six communal areas utilize CAMPFIRE.2°' These communities
control 18 percent, or 7.1 million hectares, of the country's land.20 2 Most
CAMPFIRE revenue is generated from the sale of sport hunting licenses.2 °3
However, only thirteen CAMPFIRE communities are able to turn a profit
from trophy hunting.204 CAMPFIRE is able to utilize trophy hunting as
a source of revenue because CITES only prohibits the trade of elephant
products.205 Hunting for sport is not regulated under CITES.'
CAMPFIRE allocates hunting rights by use of a quota system based on
aerial and physical studies of each communal area.207 The areas are
"9 See "Can 'CAMPFIRE' Save the Elephants?", supra note 187.
'96 See id.
'9 See id.
'g See id.
'99 See id.
2 See id.
20' See "Can 'CAMPFIRE' Save the Elephants?", supra note 187.
2 See id.
203 The use of trophy hunting as a primary source of revenue under CAMPFIRE is a
major concern of Western donor countries, and continued use of hunting may lead to less
future funding. However, supporters of CAMPFIRE point out that trophy hunting is much
more humane than systematic culling or mass poaching. The impact from sport hunting on
the elephant population is minimal in comparison to more invasive practices. See id.
2 See id.
'05 See id.
206 See CITES, supra note 8.
m CAMPFIRE also owns at least one-third of Zimbabwe's 33-ton ivory stock. The
pending ivory sale will thus benefit CAMPFIRE directly. See Cheri Sugal, Elephants of
Southern Africa Must Now 'Pay Their Way,', 10 WORLD WATCH 5, Sep. 19, 1997, at 9.
[Vol. 27:167
CITES AND THE "IVORY BAN"
surveyed to determine an approximate number of elephants and quotas,
which are issued based upon sustainable yields.2"8 Communal officials
then market the quota to safari operators, who are licensed to book hunting
trips." Safari operators are able to book trips with potential hunters,"'
targeting primarily wealthy Westerners. 21' Safaris average twenty-one
days, with multiple permits offered for various big game kills.212 A hunter
may be allowed to take, in one safari, an elephant, a lion or leopard, a
buffalo and some antelope.2 3 The cost of a hunt is high: daily fees of up
to U.S. $1000 are added to "trophy" fees assessed on a per-animal basis.21 4
Elephants bring around U.S. $10,000, while other animals bring somewhat
lesser amounts.2 5 CAMPFIRE's use of hunting as a primary means of
operation is viewed by some Westerners as an immoral practice.21 6
However, when compared to black market wholesale slaughter of entire
elephant populations, trophy hunting has a limited impact on species
survival. Because CAMPFIRE communities are able to reap significant
profits from hunting, less elephants are "used." An estimated thirty-three
cents of every dollar paid to CAMPFIRE goes directly to villages for
educational purposes, food, and even elephant conservation.2 7 Individual
safari operators receive seven cents on the dollar, and costs of implementing
the program account for the remaining sixty cents per dollar.2 I8
By engaging local people in the management of their own environment,
CAMPFIRE has provided new economic and ecological stability. From this
stability, the communities have gained a striking financial benefit. For
example, in 1995 approximately 80,000 households received a total of
around U.S. $900,000, a significant increase over previous annual in-
comes. 2 9  These monetary benefits to the communities are crucial for
economic and social development. For example the Masoke ward, .a 120-
20 See "Can 'CAMPFIRE' Save the Elephants?", supra note 187.
209 See id.
210 See id.
211 See id.
212 See id.
213 See id.
114 See "Can 'CAMPFIRE' Save the Elephants?", supra note 187.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See id.
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household community in the Guruve district, sold the rights to operate a
safari concession in 1994 for U.S. $73,000.220 That money was sufficient
to build a clinic, pay game guards, fund a soccer team, and pay four times
the average annual income to each household.22'
Most important to CAMPFIRE's conservation success is the fact that
many communities have seen a greater return from utilizing wildlife than
through other, more traditional land uses.222 Consequently, cattle ranching,
arid farming and other land uses that once ate away at elephant habitat have
yielded to sport hunting and tourism. 223 Zimbabwe's arid land, which
makes up about 80% of the country, is perfectly suitable for elephant
use.224 Elephants have benefited from CAMPFIRE's community-centric
program mainly because they are useful to villagers. The program has
reduced the number of elephants killed both by hunters and by poachers
because locals have incentives to ensure that viable elephant populations
remain.225 Only 1% of Zimbabwe's elephant population is now killed each
year.226 Because elephant populations in Zimbabwe are growing at a rate
of 5-7% annually, the 1% reduction in the elephant population caused by the
killing is sustainable.227 CAMPFIRE appears to have alleviated some of
the pressures put on the rural poor to indiscriminately kill elephants by
institutionalizing ties between conservation and economic gain.
The CAMPFIRE program has helped preserve elephants by making them
more beneficial as living creatures than as products. While ivory sales under
the COP-10 decision may inject funds into the rural economy and elephant
conservation efforts, a fatal flaw of such trade is the lack of infrastructure to
monitor it. Political and economic strife, graft, and governmental corruption
in the regions make ivory sales a dangerous gamble. Because the emphasis
is on marketability, the incentive for the countries stockpiling ivory is to
increase the available supply. Though the controls which are to be
implemented under Decisions 10.1 and 10.2 are strict, without adequate
funds and support from donor countries African nations will not be able to
carry out the conditions under these Decisions sufficiently. During the
220 See "Can 'CAMPFIRE' Save the Elephants?", supra note 187.
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See id.
225 See "Can 'CAMPFIRE' Save the Elephants?", supra note 187.
226 See id.
227 See id.
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interim period before March 1999, CITES officials and member nations must
undertake every effort to make sure controls are implemented and rigorous
anti-poaching and anti-laundering efforts are established. Only by preventing
poaching will the ivory trade experiment work. Without adequate deterrents,
poaching will once again have the potential to eradicate elephant populations.
To avoid a return to pre-ban problems, careful planning and implementation
of COP-10 decisions is imperative.
The problem is more complex than this, however. Africa's economic
predicament warrants more than quick-fix, one-time solutions. In order to
achieve lasting conservation of the African elephant, permanent solutions that
do not pressure the wholesale destruction of the animal are needed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The downlisting of the African elephant may potentially derail conserva-
tion efforts, but with proper safeguards and monitoring it may prove to be
successful-both for the elephant and for range states. However, more than
trade regulations need to be promulgated to preserve the elephant. The
history of clashes between the African elephant and humans illustrates the
need to tie their fortunes together in a more meaningful way. For the
elephant to prosper, the humans that most frequently interact with it need to
be financially secure. Through programs like CAMPFIRE and debt-for-ivory
regimes, human prosperity can be assured with minimal negative impact on
elephants. Comprehensive efforts that account for both human and elephant
needs must be enacted in order for CITES to function properly.
The operation of CITES under the decisions and resolutions of COP-10
must be carefully monitored to ensure that the sale of ivory stockpiles is not
abused. The threat to elephant viability posed by increased poaching remains
real and dangerous under the proposed sale. Non-legal conservation efforts
in conjunction with CITES provisions are essential to the continued existence
of the elephant.
Thus, economic and political support is needed to strengthen local
government's capabilities of complying with CITES and implementing
effective conservation efforts. Before the temporary ivory trade is reinstated,
infrastructure needs to be created within the range states to ensure that the
strict provisions of the downlisting are implemented. Monitoring ivory
stocks and implementing effective anti-poaching and anti-laundering regimes
should be the primary focus before the sale of ivory stockpiles occurs in
March 1999.
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